



Pan-Canadian Focus Group Workshop: Realistic and Credible Policy Advice for Canada's Defence Review

Overview

On 8 August 2016, 34 academics, 14 students and 10 government participants were invited to Carleton University to engage in a defence review workshop funded by a grant from the DND's Defence Engagement Program (DEP) and coordinated by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, Queen's Centre for International and Defence Policy and Carleton's Centre for Security, Intelligence and Defence Studies. Participants were drawn from the former Security and Defence Forum (SDF)-funded centres, along with representatives from the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA and the CDA Institute (CDA Institute) and the Canadian Global Affairs Institute in a day-long workshop designed to examine four broad policy issues: the threat environment; the status of the Canadian Armed Forces; force readiness, and missions and allies.

Directors of the former SDF centres (see Annex 1 for a list of the Centres) reflect their status as the primary repository of academic defence expertise in Canada, which, in turn, was a product of DND support for over forty-five years. The SDF program, formally established in 1994, was the successor to the DND sponsored Military and Strategic Studies (MSS) program created in 1968. The primary objective of the MSS program, and thus SDF as well, was to ensure the existence of domestic academic Canadian defence expertise at a time when it appeared that such expertise might disappear. In so doing, DND funding, which supported defence research centres across the country, provided the Department with external Canadian academic studies on defence issues of value to the Department, ensured that Canadian defence would be taught at Canadian universities, thereby generating subsequent generations of Canadian defence scholars, well-educated potential candidates for employment with DND, and future leaders with a deeper understanding of Canadian defence policies. At the same time, it generated a Canadian defence academic community network that engaged in collaborative studies on Canadian defence issues. In 2012, as part of the Department's Strategic Review, the SDF program was cancelled, and replaced by the DEP, which represented the continuation of the Special Projects component of SDF in existence since 1967. SDF and the SDF-DND relationship fostered were regularized channels of communication, information sharing, exchange of information and relevant policy research findings, and constructive engagement in debate and discussion on Canadian security and defence issues. This relationship needs to be re-established in some form or another.



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Summary of Priorities

Threats/Environments menaçants	The Forces/Les forces	Readiness/Préparation	Missions & Allies/Missions et alliés
Great Power transitions are eroding International Institutions (i.e. backsliding of democratic states, laws of armed conflict).	End of multipurpose combat capable force; develop specializations within a coherent and accessible narrative that situates defence within broader government security agenda	Enhanced Surveillance and control of Canadian airspace and water. Timely and credible response. (Interoperability with 5 eyes).	Growing resource and political demands for defence of North America (does not include Mexico), and its effect on our ability to operate elsewhere
Technological threats, including cyber	Derive structures and size from national security objectives, cognizant of budgetary constraints	Enhanced cyber, intel, surveillance	NATO collective defence, balancing deterrence while engaging Russia
Threats to Canadian Maritime Interests (Coastal Arctic and sea lanes of communication).	Develop gender and cultural lenses to achieve integrated security; requires intellectual shift via training and education	Ability to play a credible and effective role in allied operations (NATO/US) to address state and non state threats. Refer to #1 in regards to interoperability	Clear criteria for overseas operations
Violent Transnational Nonstate Actors (regional criminal networks and global terrorist groups).	Need multiple/alternative career models and transition strategies to enhance flexibility and optimize force structure (for both reg. force and reserves); e.g. give army reserve operational roles	Enhance search and rescue (Esp. Arctic)	Limited role in Pacific and South America (Defence diplomacy)
Questions regarding proliferation and use of WMD	Be restrictive with the commitments made with very expensive and specialized capabilities e.g. space, cyber, SOF, fighters, submarines	Enhanced whole of government Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief *Working assumption priorities remain 1) CND defence, 2) defence of N. America 3) allied operations & assumes procurement issues, funding issues solved	Longer, fewer missions rather than shorter and many. Need expertise, local knowledge and committed to success



Rules of Engagement

This one-day focus group workshop provided up to 5 key considerations under 4 headings (threat environment, forces, readiness and missions/allies) to aid DND's ADM Policy in the drafting of the 2017 Defence Policy. The key considerations were realistic, credible and operational.

Each group was assigned two team leaders to moderate the discussions, with graduate students serving as rapporteurs to record discussions under the Chatham House rule of non-attribution.

A very conscious and concerted effort was made to maximize participation by all of the defence centres, women defence experts and students. All of the participants were encouraged to speak in either official language and at least one of the Team Leaders from each group was bilingual.

Focus Group A (threat environment): Security and Defence Risks and Challenges (National, N. America and International)

Team Leaders: Stéfanie von Hlatky and Brian Bow

Focus Group B (the forces): Makeup of the Canadian Armed Forces (structure, size, health, training and makeup)

Team Leaders: Ferry de Kerckhove and Barbara Falk

Focus Group C (readiness): Capability, Technology and Platform Implications

Team Leaders: Tony Battista and Stephanie Carvin

Focus Group D (missions and allies): Missions, Support to Allies/Alliances and future of war

Team Leaders: Jim Fergusson and Andrea Charron

Red Teams

The bulk of the day was spent within the focus groups in a Red Team format. A Red Team is an independent group that challenges the ideas/products/conclusions of another group. Typically, the red team takes an adversarial/contrarian position with the aim of poking holes in the logic/suitability/credibility of the issue/idea at hand. Red Teams are often used by defence and security organizations before launching a mission. Red Teams think like the "enemy" and try to find all of the weaknesses/limitations of the mission.



For the purposes of this workshop, the Red Teams used the following question as their guide. “Are these 5 key issues the most important/appropriate vis-à-vis the focus theme for the purposes of advice to the defence review?” The idea, of course, is to critically evaluate the issues not the individuals who conceived of the ideas.

There were two rounds of Red Teaming, which means each Focus Group had their 5 issues evaluated by two other focus groups. The Red Teams added/deleted/reordered the 5 issues. The students recorded the discussions and Poll Everywhere was used by some of the groups to keep track of and rank order the issues.

Scene Setting

The current government of Canada has provided many hints as to the general framework of the Defence Review. Mandate Letters and the public consultation process focus on three areas: 1) The main challenges to Canada’s security (captured in Focus Group A); 2) The role of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in addressing current threats and challenges (captured in Focus Groups B and C), and 3) The resources and capabilities needed to carry out the CAF mandate (captured in Focus Group C).¹ Our workshop also considered the types of missions that the Canadian Armed Forces are likely to be engaged in, and the allies and like-minded nations likely to be involved.

The five previous defence white papers² have a number of points in common. First, the order of mission priorities has remained fairly constant:

- 1) Defence of Canada
- 2) Defence of North America
- 3) Aid to international peace and security with various alliances/organizations

Next, the current geopolitical environment is a major informant of guidelines outlined in the defence white paper. The contexts reflected to date have been: post WWII, Cold War, post-Cold War and post-9/11 representing a shift from state-based threats and defence (read large militaries) deployed overseas with allies to a growing concern for security and the homeland (read whole-of-government approach) with missions at home and abroad dealing more and more with non-state actors.

¹ Department of National Defence, “The Defence Policy Review”, found at <http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/index.asp>.

² See Annex 2 for a summary of the 1964, 1971, 1987, 1994 and 2008 Defence White Papers.



Today's geopolitical reality has seen a shift back to state-based threats. An aggressive Russia and more confident China, both seeming to buck fiscal austerity trends in terms of military spending, have put states, especially neighbouring states, on edge. There are calls by these neighbouring states for the United States to take a more decisive role and reengage with commitments on a multilateral and bilateral basis. Meanwhile, the sense of American 'declinism' is on the rise, helped by what can only be described as 'electile dysfunction' relative to the impending American elections in November 2016.

With this demand for more American leadership came calls for allies to contribute more. The NATO Warsaw Summit is likely to mean continued pressure on Canada to commit 2% of GDP funding on defence or for Canada to show concretely it is make a significant contribution. While there is internal and external pressure on Canada to do "more" in the world and maintain high-level combat capabilities, there are some key concerns with maintaining the operational pace witnessed in the 2000s.

- 1) **The health of regular and reserve forces.** From physical and mental health, concerns about an aging demographic and the need for better representation of Canada's diversity in the forces, morale and issues of respect in the workplace to training and promotion considerations, military members want to feel there is a plan for them to improve their skills and retrain as job descriptions become obsolete (e.g. lines men and women become today's cyber security experts). Arguably, the "fraternity of the uniform" has never been stronger but what happens when the uniform comes off and the growing civil-military relations gap makes reintegration more difficult? Issues of personnel are paramount and while they often do not feature in defence reviews, no review will survive if the health of the forces is not considered. What are the internal programs and reviews in the place to address these issues?
- 2) **Defence in an age of fiscal schizophrenia.** On the one hand, national and international economic statistics are pointing to potential recessions in the future. On the other hand, there is pressure on Canada to spend more on defence to be a) a good ally and b) to match political statements such as "no base closures". This likely means that while there is not going to be an increase in the budget, reconsidering all business and operational practices to find the efficiencies that represents a de facto increase in budget is what is expected of DND. That 50% of DND's budget is spent on salaries is a key area of consideration – will Canada ever reach the promised 68,000 regular forces? Is that required? The cost of CAF's Search and rescue mandate is another potential area to consider.
- 3) **Procurement Paralysis.** New platforms are in various stages of completion. The Public Works/DND/Industrial-Technological relationship is dysfunctional at best, moribund at worst. The government has indicated that its priority purchases are the naval and fighter jet replacement programme. Given the capabilities Canada will need for the next 30 – 40 years, is this prioritization appropriate?



- 4) **Alliance maintenance and US/Canada Defence Relations.** In addition to pressure to spend 2% of GDP on defence for NATO, there are questions about the future of NORAD. With a new Commander, initial investigations into a replacement of the North Warning System and talk of Canada rejoining Ballistic Missile Defence, Canada seems poised to renew and increase its commitment to NATO and NORAD. Is there any external pressure to do so, or is this nationally-driven? The latest North American summit noted the need for more defence/security cooperation between the three states on a number of issues (cyber, refugees, drugs, trafficking).³
- 5) **Missions and capacities:** Should Canada continue to be a combat capable, all-purpose force? Are there niche areas to consider? What about the aid to the civil power role? It is likely to increase with climate change and the increase in size and scope of national disasters. Can the CAF be both combat capable and Canada capable? Are different skills and platforms needed, or can one serve as a substitute for the other? And what role should Canada play in UN missions?
- 6) **Sacred cows:** The following are often portrayed as non-negotiable. Should that be the case?
 - a. No base closures
 - b. Current size of the military
 - c. Unwavering Support of the U.S. military
 - d. No Mexico in NORAD
 - e. NATO missions trump UN missions
 - f. Command Structures
- 7) **Space and Cyber Security:** Space as emerged as a vital dimension of military operations and economic well-being. Military trends have shifted from explicit engagement to what scholars have called “gray zones”, or “hybrid threats”, most notably via the internet. Cyber security has become an important area of expense for both state and non-state actors. Both space and cyber prompts considerations of the role of National Defence a the broader scope.
- 8) **South America:** As political instability and civil unrest continues to escalate south of the equator, Canada is forced to take stock of its relationships with South American states. What should Canada’s defence stance be while faced with such uncertainty, and in what ways should the Defence Review shape economic, political and military ties in the short to medium term?
- 9) **The South Pacific:** If Chinese aggressiveness in the western Pacific continues, the prospects of a major confrontation with the United States, and its allies grow. Canada needs to ask itself what its role will be alongside its strongest ally? Is Canadian support

³ See <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/29/fact-sheet-united-states-key-deliverables-2016-north-american-leaders>



in the Western Pacific an imperative? Should that be the case? What form should that support manifest itself in? Does this support fulfill Canada's security obligations?

- 10) **Ungoverned spaces and non-democratic actors:** There is a growing link between the hotspots of the world (armed conflict), ungoverned spaces (as a training ground for terrorism) and undemocratic states and actors. How should Canada deal with these actors without sacrificing key Canadian values, such as respect for rule of law? Likewise, what role should the CAF play in ungoverned spaces (such as Mali, parts of Afghanistan etc.), if any?

The "Hotwash" – An Evaluation of the Day

The one-day workshop format was appreciated as it limited time away from the office. The participants all stayed for the entire day and while all admitted it was a busy and full schedule, the concentrated time together afforded a richer exchange of ideas. Hosting the workshop on a Monday worked well for participants but may have been problematic for government representatives. The limited preparation time before the workshop was appreciated.

A scene setting document (see above) was circulated a month ahead of time which summarized some key defence concerns, outlined the procedures for the red teams as well as provided a summary of all of the past defence white papers. All of the documents were also available in a Dropbox account for wide distribution. Participants were encouraged to add to the Dropbox.

The most difficult task on the day of the workshop was to come up with the initial 5 points. Some suggested that the 5 points could be provided in advance. On the one hand, this would maximize evaluation of the suggestions and would introduce, essentially, a third red teaming session. It also cemented the focus group as a "team" – it was their initial 5 ideas that were challenged for the remainder of the day. On the other hand, if 5 points are provided the options or possibilities could be limited artificially by biasing/skewing the conversation in particular directions based on the initial, predetermined list. As well, the group may not feel as invested in the 5 points and/or in the team.

The variety of academic disciplines represented at the workshop was one of the main reasons for the success of the day. Different disciplines, methodologies and epistemologies were apparent resulting in richer, more diverse opinions than would normally be the case at workshops that arrange discussions via panels of experts usually representing a similar point-of-view on a particular subject.

The Red Teaming exercises were considered a general success although initially, there were questions about how to commence. Some of the Red Teams restricted their comments only to the 5 preceding points listed. Others felt less constrained and would contribute new ideas rather than limiting comments to criticisms only.

All of the participants and government representatives only convened in plenary 3 times: first, after initial ideas had been framed, at lunch (and only to hear the guest speaker, who while



interesting was not appropriate for the workshop. A better choice would have been to hear from DND's Assistant Deputy Minister of Policy) and finally, at the end of the day to review the final list of recommendations for each group. Consideration should be given to presenting the new lists after each Red Team session so as to clarify any wording and/or intent with respect to the changes/additions/deletions to the list.

The students were instrumental to the success and flow of the workshop. (They were the rapporteurs, and "polleverywhere" experts. Having all of the ideas on one slide was preferred so that the groups could see the progression of ideas. Keeping the groups in the same rooms and having the students 'move' the slides with the new focus group ideas worked well. Minimizing the movement of people between the rooms was a very good idea as it speeded up transitions.

Polleverywhere was not widely used but it was helpful to know that it was an option if focus groups became fixated on conflicting ideas. The word cloud brainstorming function and rank ordering function were particularly helpful for the groups that did use this online polling system.

The participants ran out of steam to complete a 'hot wash' on the logistics of the day and so the comments above were captured via emails and comments in the week proceeding the workshop.

Workshop Findings

Focus Group A: Threats/Environnements menaçants

Initial Ideas	Red Team Round 1	Red Team Round 2	Final Ideas
Challenges to Authority of International Institutions	Not a threat, an outcome. Rank= 5 Suggest removal. Replace with Proliferation.	(Focus of our #1 and #2 is a concern for Great Power competition and politics that is driving both Russia and China) Russia is the top concern due to its ongoing threat to NATO, and cyber domain.	1. Great Power Transition eroding International Institutions (i.e. backsliding of democratic states, laws of armed conflict).
Violent Transnational Actors	Rank= 4	China and its rising ambitions	2. Technological threats, including cyber.



Cyber Threats	Rename: Technological Threats. Rank= 2 Broaden to cyber, space and electronic warfare.	Non-state actors	3. Threats to Canadian Maritime Interests - Coastal Arctic and SLOC
Revisionist States	Rank= 1 Term revisionist is too narrow (including threats to Aerospace i.e. new Russian cruise missiles).	United States' errors	4. Violent Transnational Nonstate Actors (regional criminal networks and global terrorist groups)
Threats to Canadian Maritime Interests	Rank= 3 Expand to include coastal, Arctic and SLOC.	North Korea; Iran; and Unanticipated crises #6: climate change and its connection to natural disasters and arctic	5. Questions regarding proliferation and use of WMD

The participants seemed to agree that Russia and China were of particular concern to Canada. However, the nature of the particular threat was not easily articulated. On the one hand, both states, but especially Russia, have enough nuclear weapons to destroy key North American cities. Both also have offensive cyber attacking capabilities and sizeable conventional forces. On the other hand, both are important partners to deal with other crises around the world such as Syria in the Middle East. China, in particular, is the trading giant of the world and so characterizing it as a 'threat' was resisted given that Canada needs to have a healthy economic relationship with China, given its status as the second largest economy in the world.

The other category of threat that was articulated in several ways, although not stated outright, was the backsliding of the number of democratic states and/or the quality of the democratic institutions within a state. This is particularly concerning because many of these states also have nuclear, biological and chemical weapons' ambitions without the requisite state checks and balances to ensure material cannot be stolen and/or weapons launched prematurely/unintentionally. Criticism of Israel and India was muted, despite their nuclear capabilities, largely because of their ability to control access to the weapons and stable decision-making processes. Conversely, North Korea, Pakistan and Iran were routinely lambasted largely as a function of the lack of such controls.



Violent transnational actors that include terrorists (especially Islamic terrorists and more specifically Sunni-based terrorist groups like the Islamic State or Boko Haram), criminal gangs (like Hell's Angels and the Rock Machine) and transnational networks that sow anarchy (for example, Anonymous) were all considered “threats” to Canada broadly speaking, but not all of them require a defence response. Fighting international terrorism abroad is squarely within the mandate of the armed forces but within Canada, it is a constabulary issue, as is dealing with transnational criminal gangs and other networks. That being said, the fact that these criminal gangs can be a source of funds and/or support to terrorist groups means that the CAF needs to be aware and informed of their existence. The guiding principle of preparing for highly likely events, versus unlikely events is still sound.

Given that Canada depends on international trade, protection of sea lanes of communication was considered important, but not a role Canada could take on far from home. Instead, Canada should consider the protection of its own maritime boundaries (in conjunction with other government agencies). Note, references to protection of maritime territory usually referenced Canada's Arctic and the Northwest Passage. There is still an assumption that Canada's Arctic is under threat of invasion/occupation/incursion by foreign actors and that it needs to be protected. This view, while widespread, is counter to DND's and DoD's assessment of the Arctic.

Finally, cyber threats and “unanticipated events” (Donald Rumsfeld's famous unknown unknowns) were identified as issues of concern for Canada. The level of defence involvement, however, is not clear. DND/CAF presently has a mandate to protect its own cyber connections/networks; Public Safety has the mandate to protect civilian networks. However, with the call for more “whole of government” activity/operations, military networks can become vulnerable if other government agencies are not properly protected. While not an issue for the defence review per se, the dependence of DND on Shared Services Canada to provide service and protection to non-secret networks was raised. Canadian defence officials may also have to consider whether or not Canada wants to develop and launch offensive or even preemptive offensive cyber capabilities (of course the delineation between offence and defence is very blurred).

The unanticipated crises that could involve the CAF range from new transnational actors to a new war in a state previously thought to be stable or an ally of Canada. (For example, events in Turkey call into question what NATO's stance will be should Turkey threaten the alliance). South and Central America get very little attention and yet they are in Canada's backyard. There is also growing concern about the instability created by massive waves of migrant and refugee movements around the world. The role for the Canadian military, however, is limited as was demonstrated by the recent influx of Syrian refugees in which military barracks were prepared but not used. More likely is aid to G7/NATO/UN maritime patrols in the Mediterranean or elsewhere or aid in establishing Government of Canada screening camps/compounds located near large refugee populations.



For the most part, the threats identified are not dissimilar from those articulated in the 1994, 2005, and 2008 defence white papers and are in-line with the defence plans of allies dealing with crises in a post-9/11 era.

Threats that did not make the top 5 include:

What to do with the United States if:

- 1) It retreats from international engagement, as could be the case with the election of Donald Trump. Or conversely,
- 2) If its engagement in the world (e.g. 2003 invasion of Iraq) creates situations, like the rise of ISIL, that pose threats to Canada and the rest of the world.

While not a threat per se, the fact that Canada is so dependent on the United States means that Canada is vulnerable to its “big mistakes” (including the 2008 financial collapse of the U.S. markets), while at the same time benefiting from its trade and collective defence promises to Canada. Therefore, U.S. foreign and defence policies remain of primary interest to Canada and need to be tracked closely. This dependence still creates grudging loyalty at best among Canadians, and malign suspicion at worst. The fraternity of the military uniform and the closeness of the Canadian and the U.S. militaries engaged in joint missions overseas, or on a permanent footing via NORAD, remain essential to the ability of the Canadian government to rise above the internal and external polar shifts in attitudes toward Americans especially in times of crises.

Another category of threats is potentially existential. Climate change, leading to rises in sea levels, could, for example, wipe-out low lying states like the Netherlands, Singapore and Bangladesh. These effects, however, may take years and therefore, it is very difficult for the government to plan for and/or maintain sustained attention on the effects of climate change. The Canadian military has a limited role to play in Canada’s climate change policies other than to try and be as energy efficient and environmentally-focused in its operations/procurement/training decisions, continue to prepare for its aid to the civil powers’ role in times of extreme weather events (which could include the relocation of populations from weather-affected areas) and consider where climate change pressures (such as the lack of fresh water) may sow the conditions for armed conflict in the world in the future.



Focus Group B: The Forces/Les forces

Initial Ideas	Red Team Round 1 D	Red Team Round 2	Final Ideas
End of multipurpose combat capable/expand from 3 roles to coherent narrative	Stop using phrase “multipurpose” and make hard choices; Be more transparent in the development of niche capabilities	Need a clear idea of what effects the CAF should have as their goal. (consistent with point number 4)	End of multipurpose combat capable force; develop specializations within a coherent and accessible narrative that situates defence within broader gov’t security agenda
End of “professional only” (imp. For reg/reserves)	Prioritize and fix recruitment; reduce reserves	Need to ‘right size’ the four pillars (regular, reserve, civilian and contractors).	Derive structures and size from national security objectives, cognizant of budgetary constraints
Develop gender and cultural lenses for defence diplomacy	(Defence diplomacy not applicable here) Reflect and reinforce diversity of Canada in forces, with inclusion of gender and cultural training	Concur with red team’s second point. Credible policies regarding recruitment, retention and retirement/transition (age and medical).	Develop gender and cultural lenses to achieve integrated security; requires intellectual shift via training and education
Derive structures from purpose (objectives before resources)	Defence planning based on budgetary realities, remember that operations, maintenance and training are	Budgeting and priorities must live longer than the 3-4 year political cycle.	Need multiple/alternative career models and transition strategies to enhance flexibility and optimize force



	important Alternative is to spend more, but even then must make hard choices		structure (for both reg. force and reserves); e.g. give army reserve operational roles
Special forces for exp. tasks?	How do the forces adapt to the development of cyber and space capabilities?	Adjust for a competitive promotion system designed to reward specific, relevant skills (Cyber and New Tech). Regularly evaluate and update.	Be restrictive with the commitments made with very expensive and specialized capabilities e.g. space, cyber, SOF, fighters, submarines

Common themes evident in all of the discussions concern the need to fix recruitment/retention policies (for both the regular forces and reserves). Related, there were many calls for an (re)investigation into the different classes of reserves (especially the Army Reserves) including how they are trained and managed, and whether these categories of reserves still make sense in today's economic market. Furthermore, the process to switch from reserves to regular forces needs to be fixed, as it is an unnecessarily lengthy process. More attention needs to be paid to not only the diversity of the makeup of the forces but also the cultural training the forces receive to operate in locations around the world.

Another theme was to consider the skills and trades of the current forces and consider what might be needed in the future. Example, is the forces recruiting/training cyber specialists? If so, is there a career path for them within the armed forces? Do we need generalists or specialists? Are the forces exposed to different world views (for example, do they understand the implication of UN Security Resolution 1325 that focuses on the protection of women in conflict? Is this sort of training given to non-commissioned and Commissioned officers? And/or does more attention need to be paid to the traditional hands-on military training (e.g. target shooting etc.?) and is equal attention given to NCMs and Officers?

Yet another debate was whether or not the Canadian armed forces should be able to participate in any type of mission/operation, especially overseas, or whether it should develop niche areas of expertise in consultation with allies. For example, one suggestion, given Canada's limited overall troop size, is to have larger cadre of special forces, augmented with specialized niche battalions (logistics or training perhaps). Others disagreed and felt that Canada is already too 'niched', should restrict the commitment of its specialized forces, and concentrate on training the



forces to be able to complete a variety of operations and missions that run the gamut from aid to the civil powers in natural disasters to large combat missions overseas.

Training is often the first pillar to be cut in fiscally austere times and that needs to change. This trend toward cutting training resources is a function of the fact that the government often makes budget decisions based on available funds first rather than the role and structure of the forces.

The majority of participants felt that Canada needed multi-purpose, combat capable forces, but concerns were expressed that constant reference to combat roles suggests that Canada only seeks such roles which is inaccurate. Related, the government needs to be more transparent and clear about what the forces are being sent to do (particularly for overseas missions), how success will be measured and what exit criteria entails. In other words, the narrative that the government uses to justify/explain why the forces are required needs to be clear, consistent and regularly evaluated.

Many of the participants noted the fact that few in the academic defence community had in-depth understanding of how the forces are trained/recruited/promoted. This is limited to a small cadre of experts (appropriately at Canadian Forces College). DND and the CAF are encouraged to invite academics on training exercises and missions so that a wider array of academics can understand and appreciate better the types of issues/problems discussed and how the forces are trained.



Focus Group C: Readiness/Préparation

Initial Ideas	Red Team Round 1	Red Team Round 2	Final Ideas
1 Surveillance and control of Canadian airspace and water. Timely and credible response	1. Surveillance and control of Canadian airspace and water. Enhance search and rescue. Cyber	Enhanced actionable intel and analysis; 5-eyes	Enhanced Surveillance and control of Canadian airspace and water. Timely and credible response. (Interoperability with 5 eyes).
2 Enhanced cyber, intel, surveillance,	2. Enhanced analytics, intel, surveillance in contributing overseas	Control of CAN airspace, water, cyberspace; higher priority on SAR, new organization?	Enhanced cyber, intel, surveillance.
3 Ability to play a credible and effective role in allied operations to address state and non state threats	3. US and NATO-based deterrence of state threats. High priority on interoperability	Same; but broaden interoperability for better effect (i.e. technical/legal)	Ability to play a credible and effective role in allied operations (NATO/US) to address state and non state threats. Refer to #1 in regards to interoperability
4 Enhance search and rescue (Esp. Arctic)	4. Limited and focused defence cooperation in dealing with non-state actors in failed states	Focused security cooperation with actors in fragile/failing states; partnering to combat virtual	Enhance search and rescue (Esp. Arctic) (not exclusive to military see point #2).



		NSAs (against CAN interests)	
5 Humanitarian operations assistance *Working assumption priorities remain 1) CND defence, 2) defence of NA 3) allied operations **assumes procurement issues, funding issues solved ***group studied "effects" rather than platforms	5. Humanitarian operations assistance	Same. Do you mean DART?	Enhanced whole of government Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief *Working assumption priorities remain 1) CND defence, 2) defence of N. America 3) allied operations **assumes procurement issues, funding issues solved ***group studied "effects"

Rather than focus on platforms and/or operations/maintenance (O & M), it was felt that the desired effects were a better place to start in deciding the readiness of the forces. A major preoccupation of all groups contemplating the forces' readiness wrestled with how to ensure that the right type and number of forces was available/prepared in time to achieve the specific aims of the government, which still run the full range of missions from aid to civil power right through to combat missions. Advanced intelligence and surveillance is one way to build in preparation time for the forces with a particular need to ensure Canada is defended first, followed by defence of North America, with international operations having a greater degree of discretion. This necessitates trained analysts to interpret the information/intelligence gathered in a timely manner delivered in a timely and useful format to policy makers.

DND/CAF needs to continue to:

- 1) Shape relationships and partnerships (at the local, provincial, national and international levels), integrate planning/play book development, train/conduct exercises with the goal of mitigating/preparing to
- 2) Anticipate threats
- 3) Respond to threats



- 4) Stabilize situations
- 5) Transition and reflect on the process and outcome

The aerial search and rescue role of the military was raised a few times. First, it is an expensive role. Second, few other allied countries mandate their military with such a role. That being said, few other states have as much territory and/or extreme weather conditions with which to contend. The military is the only profession with unlimited liability and the skills/platforms used for search and rescue is not antithetical to other roles the forces are asked to undertake. Similar arguments can be made for the Forces' aid to the civil authority role. The concern, however, is that the Forces' SAR and aid to the civil authority mandates can obfuscate assessments of whether the Forces are the best organization to fulfill these roles, instead of perhaps discretely supporting other government departments and agencies.

Given that Canada rarely operates alone, interoperability of platforms, skills and processes are critical for the Canadian Armed Forces to remain relevant and credible. Note, however, the idea that Defence must promote Canadian industry was not discussed.

As technology changes, so does the need for laws (Canadian and international) and ROEs to change as well. This requires policy makers, both inside and outside of the military, to consider the consequences of new actors, techniques, types of wars, and the continued 'revolution of military affairs'.

Finally, civil-military affairs no longer get the attention it once did especially during the Cold War. With a military that is potentially becoming less reflective of civil society (because of their size and the lack of conscription or total war experience among the general public), there is concern about a growing military-civilian divide that needs to be addressed. Civilian oversight **MUST** be retained at the political level (AND not at the bureaucratic civil service level). Political leaders need to ask tougher questions of military leadership; likewise military leadership needs to manage better the expectations of government as to what they can reasonably achieve given fiscal and other pressures.



Focus Group D: Missions & Allies/Missions et alliés

Initial Ideas	Red Team Round 1	Red Team Round 2	Final Ideas
Growing resource demands for defence of North America	Questioning growing, “resource”, defence v. security; “N. America” (central America?) vs. niche NORAD; CAN interests vs. pleasing US	1. North America - Bilateral relationship with US and attempt to form trilateral relationships (with Mexico)	Growing resource and political demands for defence of North America (does not include Mexico), and its effect on our ability to operate elsewhere
Capacity, criteria, and prioritization for missions (What role in UN?)	Define priorities & interests in advance; Keeping US happy; protect trade routes; enhance int’l legal governance; re: UN – problem of narratives and disconnect between UNSC candidacy and military role; non-UN missions; enhance Canadian understanding of actual DPKO roles/risks	2. NATO environment more difficult due to Brexit depending on strategic opportunism. Prioritizing NATO’s collective defence. Canada contributions to NATO on containment and positive engagement with Russia.	NATO collective defence, balancing deterrence while engaging Russia
NATO and engage Russia	Deterrence with our allies; military to signal commitment; engage R. Yes, but limited CAN influence; SAR; mil-	3. Support through UN for regional security organizations for out of area operations	Criteria for overseas operations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do agree with the RoEs? • Is there a clear end state? • Do we agree with the



	mil coop, prepare for post-Putin Russia; What does containment mean in the 21C?		end state? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are allies and partners contributing? • Acceptable command and control structure? • Legal mandate? • Regional buy-in? • Enough Canadian assets to influence the mission
Limited role in Pacific and South America	Should we prioritize geography v other decision making factors? Canada is Pacific Rim; S. American/Caribbean critical for US/CAN; value added for CAN v US	4. Defence diplomacy SLOCs.	Limited role in Pacific and South America (Defence diplomacy)
Longevity vs Geographic Scope	Need to distinguish CAN interests in short/long term	5. Left blank	Longer, fewer missions rather than shorter and many Expertise, local knowledge, committed to success

There was general consensus that the order of operations/attention for the CAF needs to remain defence of Canada then North America and then elsewhere. NATO was favoured over UN operations for a variety of reasons including the current threat posed by Russia, the experience of operating within a NATO collective defence framework and relative ease of working with allies versus UN partners. In other words, given two operations that require Canadian assistance, one NATO-led and one UN-led, the majority of academics would chose a NATO mission. However, it was clearly recognized that is not necessarily the current government's preference. (It is noted, for example, senior military officers and senior public servants attending the National Security Programme at Staff College are visiting Africa this year.)

As well, many argued for fewer overseas missions *per se*, especially given limited capabilities and resources. Instead, Canada should focus upon a select few missions, along with a long-term commitment in order for the CAF to gain expertise, local knowledge that should, ultimately, lead to a more successful outcome. These assumptions as well may not align with current



government priorities that seem to favour immediate impact benefitting many crises/conflicts in the world.

Defence of Canada and North America, the assets required and the amount of resources they take is often overlooked. There is mounting evidence that the defence of Canada and North America is likely to become more costly and more important given: 1) rust out of equipment (read especially North Warning system); 2) need for new technology to respond to changing threats (e.g. the growing threat of cruise missiles versus lack of any ability of Canada to defend against them) 3) and a United States that is requiring more from Canada in terms of contributions. Given that a larger portion of DND budget is likely needed for Canada and North American defence, then this has implications for operations abroad.

First, it is highly unlikely Canada can contribute any response of significance to a conflict in the Pacific (read especially South China Sea). Instead, Canada's defence diplomacy skills (e.g. port visits, multilateral training exercises) are a more likely and appropriate response. Similarly, the impact Canada can make in theatres close to home in South and Central America must be considered. Growing instability in South America is a very short distance from threatening Canada and the United States. More attention needs to be paid to events in this part of the world. Again, however, Canada is more likely to contribute via defence diplomacy than in terms of deploying personnel.

Overseas missions are fraught with complications (historical experience with disastrous UN missions are especially an endearing effect on resistance to UN missions). Rather than fixating on the mission umbrella, Canada is wise to formulate criteria that will help the government decide if a contribution by the CAF is in Canada's interest. This is not to say that the criteria should be a hard-and-fast-must-tick-each-criterion prescriptive list. Rather, the list will help guide the government, the public and the CAF with a set of key decision thresholds to consider in advance of any mission rather than the ad hoc, after-the-fact justification that often happens when a crisis develops and the UN/NATO/ad hoc coalitions scramble for contributions. Some of the criteria includes:

- Agreement with the RoEs
- a clear end state to the crisis and to Canada's involvement
- Significant allied and partner contributions
- Acceptable command and control structure
- Legal mandate
- Regional buy-in



Parking Lot Issues

A number of points were raised that while not appropriate for the Defence Review, are still important comments/criticisms for ADM Pol to consider.

- 1) As counseled by James Eayrs many years ago,⁴ Canada is most successful when its foreign (and defence policy) stays within the middle ground between finger wagging moralism and hard core realism. In other words, sending the forces into the world need to be for clearly articulated tied to a national interest, not a vaguely-referenced value.
- 2) Should the Defence Review, a document normally signed only by the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister, be signed by Cabinet? If the defence review is intended as a road map for the government of Canada to make difficult choices in times of crises, then Cabinet should sign the document and, indeed, opposition members should be given the opportunity to endorse the document. Others disagreed arguing that Cabinet effectively does sign it, implicitly, and the opposition responds publically one way or the other.

⁴ James Eayrs, *Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1966). See also Kim Richard Nossal, "Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy 40 Years On: Realism and Idealism in Canadian Foreign Policy", *International Journal* Vol 62 (2) (Spring 2007): 263-277.



Annex 1: List of Participants, List of Former SDF Centres and Administrative Details

Focus Group A (threat environment): Security and Defence Risks and Challenges (National, N. America and International)

Team Leaders: Stéfanie von Hlatky and Brian Bow

Focus Group B (the forces): Makeup of the Canadian Armed Forces (structure, size, health, training and makeup)

Team Leaders: Ferry de Kerckhove and Barbara Falk

Focus Group C (readiness): Capability, Technology and Platform Implications

Team Leaders: Tony Battista and Stephanie Carvin

Focus Group D (missions and allies): Missions, Support to Allies/Alliances and future of war

Team Leaders: Jim Fergusson and Andrea Charron

A - Threat	B – Forces	C - Readiness	D – Mission and Allies
Stefanie Von Hlatky (TL)	Ferry de Kerkhoeve (TL)	Stephanie Carvin (TL)	Jim Fergusson (TL)
Brian Bow (TL)	Barbara Falk (TL)	Tony Battista (TL)	Andrea Charron (TL)
Aisha Ahmad	Veronica Kitchen	David Dewitt	Theo McLaughlin
Brian Job	Alan Okros	Elinor Sloan	Srdjan Vucetic
Jeremy Littlewood	David Bercusson	David Perry	Stephan Saideman
Anessa Kimball	David Mutimer	Binyam Solomon	Thomas Juneau
Charles Davies	Daniel Gosslin	Ron Buck	Kim Richard Nossal
Lee Joseph Marshall	Marie-Joelle Zahar	David McDonagh	Justin Massie
Nicole Bartlett (student)	Alex Wilner	Jeffrey Rice (student)	Jane Boulden
Mark Haichin (student)	Michael Shkolnik (student)	Uri Marantz (student)	Alex Rudolph (student)
Oksana Drozdova (student)	Geoff Tasker (student)	Kyle MacDonald (student)	Uriel Marantz (student)
Meaghan Shoemaker (student)	Robert Legere (student)	Joshua Davis (student)	Sara Greco (student)

TL = Team Leader

Government representatives in attendance:

Kristine Ennis-Heis
 LCol Cody Sherman
 Matt Osika

TBS
 DND Int
 DND Int



Scott Payne
Henry Mark
Lorne Richardson
Shane Rooney
Julia Aceti
Brodie Ross
Andrew Campion

DND Int
CCG
TC
ADM POL
ADM POL
ADM POL
ADM POL

Former SDF Centres

Centre for Security, Intelligence and Defence Studies, Carleton University

Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Dalhousie University

Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University

Centre sur la sécurité internationale, Université de Laval

Centre for International Relations, University of British Columbia

Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary

The Gregg Centre, University of New Brunswick

Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies, Wilfrid Laurier University

Centre for International and Security Studies, York University

Groupe d'étude et de recherche sur la sécurité internationale, Université McGill et Université de Montréal

Centre d'études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité, UQAM



Administrative Details

Workshop Agenda

Monday 8 August 2016

Rooms 2220/2224/2228 River Building

Carleton University 1125 Colonel By, Ottawa Ontario K1S 5B6

Focus Group Rooms 3220/3224/3228/3112 River Building

Carleton University Ottawa ON

08h00 – 17h00

8:00am – Registration and Light Breakfast

8:30 – 8:45 – Welcome by Principal Investigators. Recap of Rules of Engagement.

8:45 – 9:45 – Focus Groups will leave to preassigned syndicate rooms for discussions. Goal – produce 5 issues of importance

Break

10:00 – 11:00 – 10 min presentation of 5 key issues by Focus Groups in plenary

11:00 – Red Teams Round 1 Goal: critically evaluate the 5 issues. Suggestions for additions or deletions to be noted.

Noon – 13:00pm – lunch and special guest speaker, Dr. Amanda Rogers "What's in a Name?: ISIS and the Stakes of the 'State'"

13:00 – 14:00 – Red Teams Round 2

14:00 – 14:45 – Teams reconvene in their syndicate rooms to agree on 5 key policy recommendations based on feedback from red teaming (poll everywhere to capture top issue choices)

14:45 – 15:00 – break

15:00 – 16:15 – 15 minute report by each focus group in plenary (poll everywhere to capture top issue choices in syndicate)

16:15 – 17:00 HOT Wash/Workshop Concluding remarks

(Observers/Government representatives are free to roam between focus groups)

Rm	Initial Meeting 8:45 – 9:45	Red Team Round 1 11h00 – noon	Red Team Round 2 13h00 – 14h00	Reconvene 14:00 – 14:45
3220	Focus Group A	Focus Group A will Red Team C	Focus Group A will Red Team D	Focus Group A
3224	Focus Group B	Focus Group B will Red Team D	Focus Group B will Red Team C	Focus Group B
3228	Focus Group C	Focus Group C will Red Team A	Focus Group C will Red Team B	Focus Group C
3112	Focus Group D	Focus Group D will Red Team B	Focus Group D will Red Team A	Focus Group D



Annex 2: Summary of Previous Defence White Papers

2008 Canada First Defence Strategy Harper/Bush Jr/Obama

<http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canada-first-defence-strategy.page>

“It will produce a first-class, modern military that is well trained, well equipped and ready to take on the challenges of the 21st century.”

- Post 9/11
- International terrorism is a huge preoccupation
- Economy was fairly healthy at time of drafting but CFDS notes there is fat to trim
- Deep into Afghanistan mission
- Procurement to grow the economy
- Stable, predictable funding (which turned out not to be the case post economic collapse)
- Ethnic and border conflicts, fragile states, resurgent nationalism and global criminal networks continue to threaten international stability. In addition, unequal access to resources and uneven economic distribution are proving to be increasing sources of regional tension even as existing low-intensity or frozen conflicts in Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and the Balkans remain largely unresolved.
- The proliferation of advanced weapons and the potential emergence of new, nuclear-capable adversarial states headed by unpredictable regimes are particularly worrisome, as is the pernicious influence of Islamist militants in key regions. The ongoing buildup of conventional forces in Asia Pacific countries is another trend that may have a significant impact on international stability in coming years.
- Canada also faces challenges on the home front. Catastrophic events, such as floods, forest fires, hurricanes and earthquakes, can overwhelm local capabilities.
- Focus on the Arctic
- Canadian Forces changed to Canadian Armed Forces

Priorities

1. Canada first
2. Defence of N. America
3. Elsewhere (usually US coalition or NATO)

The military will deliver on this level of ambition by maintaining its ability to conduct six core missions within Canada, in North America and globally, at times simultaneously. Specifically, the Forces will have the capacity to:

1. Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD;
2. Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics;
3. Respond to a major terrorist attack;



4. Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster;
5. Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period; and
6. Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods.

Goals

- Increase the number of military personnel to 70,000 Regular Forces and 30,000 Reserve Forces;
- Replace the Forces' core equipment fleets, including:
 - 15 ships to replace existing destroyers and frigates;
 - 10 to 12 maritime patrol aircraft;
 - 17 fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft;
 - 65 next-generation fighter aircraft; and
 - a fleet of land combat vehicles and systems.
- Strengthen the overall state of the Forces' readiness to deploy, and their ability to sustain operations once deployed; and
- Improve and modernize defence infrastructure.

None of the projects have come to fruition fully.

2005 A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence Martin and Bush Jr.

<http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/D2-168-2005E.pdf>

This policy statement was released along with a statement on Foreign Policy, on Development and on Diplomacy. The Defence statement summarizes Canada's latest defence policy, outlining the government's plan to build on existing bilateral defence arrangements and develop new approaches to defence cooperation with the United States. The paper describes the current international security environment, articulates a new vision for the Canadian forces, and outlines a new approach to protecting Canada and Canadians. It explains the rationale for a stronger Canada-U.S. defence relationship and describes how Canada plans to contribute to a safer and more secure world.

- Post 9/11 – threat environment stresses “uncertain world”
- Threat of terrorism (now a global threat as witnessed by attacks in Madrid, Istanbul, Bali and Mombasa) and link to failed and failing states (Somalia, Afghanistan, Haiti or Sudan), which lead to civil wars and humanitarian disasters
- Afghanistan is an example of a regional flashpoint
- WMD (especially in hands of terrorists). Some enthusiasm that 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that will dramatically shrink U.S. and Russian operational
- nuclear forces.
- (note In April 2004, the Government released its first National Security Policy, which sets out a broad range of new initiatives in areas such as intelligence, emergency planning



and management, public health crises, and transportation and border security, to counter the major threats to Canadians. The intergovernmental Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOCs) were created)

- Renewed emphasis on defence of Canada and North America, followed by international operations (NATO first)
- the Canadian Forces will be increased by 5,000 Regular and 3,000 Reserve personnel.
- Start of transformation – including better integrating maritime, land, air and special operations forces, improve coordination with other government departments, interoperability with allies, creation of a *Special Operations Group* to respond to terrorism and threats to Canadians and Canadian interests around the world, a *Standing Contingency Task Force* and other special task forces
- creation of a national operational command headquarters (Canada Command)
- builds on 2002-03 Defence Update
- Operational tempo is high - May 2004, Canada ranked second among NATO nations in the percentage of personnel deployed on multinational operations and sixth in terms of total numbers
- PTSD is recognized as an issue given operational tempo
- With a few exceptions, most of the Canadian Forces' major operations have borne no resemblance to the traditional peacekeeping model of lightly armed observers supervising a negotiated ceasefire. Trend is toward fighting the "three block war" - land forces could be engaged in combat operations against well-armed militia forces in one city block, stabilization operations in the next block, and humanitarian relief and reconstruction two blocks over.
- Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) was mentioned a few times (role in Sri Lanka)
- Role of CAF in asserting sovereignty in the North mentioned
- No decline expected in demand for CAF to deploy overseas in the future
- Numerous procurement promises including modernization of CF18, new maritime helicopters, medium to heavy lift helicopters, replace the Buffalo,
- CAF to support 2004 *Joint Statement on Common Security, Common Prosperity: A New Partnership in North America*
- Call for NORAD to consider role vis-à-vis maritime threats
- The Government believes that the UN continues to have an important role to play in peace support operations, particularly for the legitimacy that it confers on these missions and will support R2P

1994 Defence White paper Chrétien and Clinton/Bush Jr.

http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D3-6-1994-eng.pdf

“The primary obligation of the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces is to protect the country and its citizens from challenges to their security. In the final analysis, a



nation not worth defending is a nation not worth preserving.” P. 1 Calls for “... effective, realistic an affordable policy...” “Most areas of defence will be cut.” para 52.

- Special Joint Committee on Defence Policy drafted a report that informed the Defence White Paper. Public consultations undertaken.
- Cold War is over. “At present, there is no immediate direct threat to Canada, and today’s conflicts are far from Canada’s shores.”: para 21.
- Biggest challenge at home is fiscal considerations. 1994 White Paper referenced as “decade of darkness” – budget of CAF slashed, fewer staff, fewer military personnel, less equipment, fewer layers of bureaucracy (\$15 billion over the next 15 years): para 57. Procurement of “off-the-shelf” commercial technology whenever possible: para 59
- P5 optimistic about helping the world via UN
- Age of civil wars (creating a lot of refugees and instability)
- Peacekeeping de rigueur but changing to peace-enforcement (but still more with UN)
- Age of humanitarian intervention (military setting up safe havens and delivering food aid)
- Canadian bases in Germany closed - closure of CFB Baden-Soellingen in 1994 and CFB Lahr in 1995. These were fairly large NATO bases with a very significant Canadian presence)
- Start of missions for “failed states”
- Rwanda, Somalia, Iraq, Balkans wars all in the 1990s. List of criteria to get involved: 1) clear, enforceable mandate, 2) clear reporting authority; 3) national composite of forces appropriate for mission and consultation of troop contributing states; 4) clear authority when military and civilian actors (need for clear command and control mention several times)
- Paragraph 50 outlines specific military responses to international stability. E.g. a naval task group, 3 separate battle groups or a brigade group, 1 squadron of tactical transport aircraft
- The number of personnel deployed on foreign operations should not exceed the sustainable ceiling of 4,000

Goal

- 60,000 reg forces, 23, 000 reserve which was a cut from previous years.
- Still asking for a helicopter to replace the Sea King
- 12 maritime coastal defence vessels
- 4 gently used submarines....
- Replacement of cougar armored vehicles
- Replacement for Labrador search and rescue helicopters



- “multipurpose, combat capable force” (i.e. be all things to all people but on a very tight budget)
- Canada can't have its own defence industry... too expensive
- NATO only had 16 members in 1994 (today there are 28)
- Very keen to help strengthen the UN
- Time to reach out to Asia Pacific (carefully and slowly). Even more gingerly for Middle East
- Scant mention of Arctic (para 79 –Rangers)
- Does mention men and WOMEN in uniform

Priorities

- 1) Protect Canada and citizens (while no cold war, world still has lots of instability)
- 2) US still the most important ally
- 3) UN, NATO, CSCE (today's OSCE). If NATO needs help, Canada will go, no questions asked. For UN missions, must have proper authority/permission of host states
- 4) Rogue states (esp. with WMD) is a concern
- 5) Trade still seen as very important (listed as one of the “obstacles” of civil wars and instability)

6 simultaneous missions expected of CAF is not dissimilar from CFDS. (E.g. defend Canada, aid to civil powers, terrorism etc.)

1987 Defence White Paper: Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada (note title) Mulroney and Reagan/Bush Sr.

http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D2-73-1987-eng.pdf

Note polar view on front cover – Arctic needs to be defended BECAUSE of Cold War, not for the Arctic

“There is no external threat which is unique to Canada and Canada cannot assure its security alone”.

- Canada is caught between 2 superpowers so international stability is in Canada's best interest.
- Economic and security survival rests with the US.
- CF18s were “state of the art” p. 18



- This new policy "will help ensure for our children a sovereign and free Canada in a more peaceful world".
- Lots of charts comparing NATO to Warsaw Pact
- Cold War about to end but White Paper assumes it is heating up
- The White Paper reinforced Canada's commitments to NATO and the defence of North America and proposed various equipment purchases to close what was perceived to be a commitment-capability gap in Canada's military establishment. (Note, that by April 1989 federal Budget, the government announced the closing of some military bases, a 2,500-cut in military personnel, and the cancellation of some equipment projects, such as the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. In all, the Department of National Defence (DND) was to cut \$2.7 billion over the next five years. Subsequently, the 1990 federal Budget placed a 5% ceiling on DND's planned expenditures for the next two years and cut an additional 1,500 personnel. The 1991 Budget, however, added extra money for defence because of the costs incurred by operations at Oka and in the Persian Gulf War.)
- Proposal to buy 10-12 nuclear subs (SSNs) Unnecessary when cold War ended
- REPLACEMENT of the DEW line with North Warning System for NORAD – major, major expense
- Promise of purchase of long range aircraft (Auroras) and Tracker medium range aircraft
- More rangers and reserves for Arctic
- (in Foreign policy – Mulroney focused on apartheid in South Africa)
- note still had airborne regiment (disbanded by Chretien after Somalia Affair)

Priorities

- 1) Strategic Deterrence – missile defence and participation in NATO programs (AWACs)
- 2) Conventional Deterrence – personnel and equipment
- 3) Sovereignty – patrols, new NWS
- 4) Peacekeeping – for which the paper outlined how UN missions would be evaluated. #1 – must be a clear mandate (lesson from various “bungles in the jungle” e.g. Congo) Cyprus was the big mission at the time. Also lumps foreign disaster relief with this priority
- 5) Arms Control

Canadian Forces needed to increase in # and capabilities to face Soviet challenges
-big concern with Soviet subs, bombers and sub-launched cruise missiles
- This was age of Regan and “Star Wars”

1971 Defence White Paper: Defence in the 70s Trudeau and Nixon/Ford/Carter

http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D3-6-1971-eng.pdf



(Note front picture of Army in white snowsuits and with snow shoes for Arctic deployments)

“Catastrophic war between 2 superpowers is only threat to Canada” p.6

Trudeau

- looming in background was FLQ October 1970 crisis – keeping country together was paramount
- Armed Forces is part of the soln because you have soldiers from across Canada at the same base/barracks. P. 12
- Armed forces also key to development of the North
- Start of détente for Cold War. The bipolar world looked much more stable. Trudeau is reaching out to Communist China for trade deals and to the USSR (US will go AFTER Canada). China was now a nuclear power.... To be watched.
- Canada was keen for Europe to take on more of the NATO burden
- Protecting Canada a priority but cost effectively (1970s big economic meltdown)
- focus on surveilling the Arctic
- Also established an environmental role for military (pay more attention to their polluting footprint esp. in Arctic)
- Wanted technology to detect submarines as well.
- Rangers in North given priority
- SALT and other nuclear treaties in place but Cuban missile crisis loomed in the background – one had to be wary of the Soviets
- Cyprus is big Canadian UN mission but notes less ambitious than heady days of UNEF 1 and others in the 1960s
- Still bitterness over 1968 forces amalgamation: no longer identified army, navy or air force but rather unified Canadian Armed Forces –purple bars to indicate rank but no pride of elemental environment. Decision was reversed. (However, note, the Army, Navy and air force today have no separate legal status – they are simply “elements” under the Canadian Armed Forces).

Priorities – a defence policy that allows Canadians to prosper and thrive, promotes HR etc. (and read stay together given recent French/English tensions) pg. 3

1. Surveillance of Canadian territory (and note growing role concerning aid to civil powers)
2. Defence on North America – except note NOT ONE MENTION OF NORAD
3. Commitments to NATO
4. Peacekeeping/Peace Support roles

1964 Defence White paper (no other title) Pearson and Johnson/Nixon



http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D3-6-1964-eng.pdf

“Preserve the peace by developing collective DEFENCE (i.e. NATO) measures to deter military aggression; to support Canadian foreign policy...esp with international organizations; and to provide for protection and surveillance of our territory”. p. 5 Note, this is a slightly different order of priorities from the norm

- first Defence White Paper for Canada. Therefore, much of it is an explanation of the world and Canada since 1945.
- Canada had also recently made a deliberate decision NOT TO BE A NUCLEAR power
- Pearson had been President of General Assembly in 1952. Received Nobel Prize in 1957 for Suez Crisis – he was Mr. UN.
- major thrust of the 1964 White Paper is to create the force structure of today. Rather than 3 heads of Defence (army, navy air force), this paper created the position of Chief of the Defence Staff AND created a Deputy Minister to control civilian DND and put Canadian Forces and civilian DND under the same Minister. Goal was for civilians to do more administration to achieve cost savings.
- RCAF and RCN were now on equal footing with Army – indeed future looks to be an air and ocean future, not land.
- Smaller units after war
- Joint Staff - so army, navy and air elements could be deployed together.
- Mentions need for more research and development and partnership with industry
- Plans for sea lift to aid UN missions – no particular vessel mentioned
- Exposure to NATO and NORAD was providing vital international training (which presumably, was good for UN missions as well)
- Canada not expected to make its own equipment
- Talk of a “new aircraft” to support ground troops... start of the CF 15
- Canada bought the Hercules aircraft in 1964

Notable achievements of Canada:

- membership to UN
- membership to NATO
- nuclear weapons (and mention of NORAD’s role –created in 1957, signed in 1958)
- Canada’s military was stationed in Europe in Germany, France and UK. Fewer in Canada throughout the 1950s (500,000 soldiers rotated through Korea between 1950-1954 - US had 1 Million). Defence White paper called for more forces IN Canada but they would be mobile and ready to deploy to Europe if needed.

Therefore preference of mission order:



- Collective security with UN
- Collective defence via NATO
- Partnership with the US
- National measures to protect Canada

BUT, the priorities for new equipment are:

- 1) Protection of Canada
- 2) Europe (NATO)
- 3) Maritime forces
- 4) UN mission
- 5) For Reserves